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1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of fault tolerance has become increasingly
important during the past decades because of the increased
use of computers in many aspects of almost everyone’s
life [1]. A fault is a defect in the hardware or software
that can lead to an incorrect state. In most cases, a fault
first causes an error in the service state of a component,
and the external output state is not immediately affected.
Faults can result in errors, and errors are liable to eventually
cause system failures. The primary goal of fault tolerance
is to prevent errors from leading to system failure [2].
The safety I&C systems in nuclear power plants have
been designed to perform the safety functions required for
a design basis event (DBE) in the presence of the following:
a) any single detectable failure within the safety systems
concurrent with all identifiable but non-detectable failures,
b) all failures caused by a single failure, and c) all failures
and spurious system actions that cause, or are caused by,
the DBE requiring the safety function [7]. This single-
failure criterion has been applied for the fault-tolerant
capability of safety grade I&C equipment. 
The safety I&C system is required to perform its safety
function to maintain plant parameters within acceptable
limits established for a DBE, regardless of any single-
failure occurring within the system [9]. In addition, the
safety I&C system should be designed to prevent a spurious
actuation, because the spurious actuation of a reactor trip
or an ESF actuation can cause a threat to public welfare.
Therefore, the plant protection system (PPS) has been
designed with hardware redundancy of four independent
channels with 2-out-of-4 coincidence logic.
Common-cause failure (CCF) means the loss of
function to multiple structures, systems, or components
due to a shared root cause [15]. The CCF includes those
that can result from external environmental effects, design
deficiencies, manufacturing errors, maintenance errors, and
operator errors [7]. Digital I&C systems can be vulnerable
to CCFs caused by software errors or software developed
logic, which could defeat the redundancy achieved by the
hardware architecture [9]. Therefore, diversity and defense-
in-depth (D3) has become an important issue to overcome
the CCF of the safety I&C systems. 
The diverse protection system (DPS) has been provided
to mitigate an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS)
and common cause failures (CCF) of safety I&C systems
of Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR1400) nuclear
units in Korea [3]. The major protection system in the
APR1400 is the safety-grade PPS. The DPS, a non-safety
For the improvement of APR1400 Diverse Protection System (DPS) design, the Advanced DPS (ADPS) has recently been
developed to enhance the fault tolerance capability of the system. Major fault masking features of the ADPS compared with
the APR1400 DPS are the changes to the channel configuration and reactor trip actuation equipment. To minimize the fault
occurrences within the ADPS, and to mitigate the consequences of common-cause failures (CCF) within the safety I&C
systems, several fault avoidance design features have been applied in the ADPS. The fault avoidance design features include
the changes to the system software classification, communication methods, equipment platform, MMI equipment, etc. In
addition, the fault detection, location, containment, and recovery processes have been incorporated in the ADPS design.
Therefore, it is expected that the ADPS can provide an enhanced fault tolerance capability against the possible faults within
the system and its input/output equipment, and the CCF of safety systems.
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system, provides partial back-up means to the PPS, and it
provides diverse methods to trip the reactor, and also to
provide some engineered safety feature (ESF) functions
to satisfy the ATWS and CCF requirements [4&5].
All the Optimized Power Reactor 1000 (OPR1000) and
the APR1400 nuclear units in Korea have been designed
with the DPS, which has the diverse reactor trip function
and the diverse auxiliary feedwater actuation signals (AFAS)
initiation function for the engineered safety feature –
component control system (ESF-CCS) [6]. As shown in
Figure 1, the DPS for the APR1400, which includes Shin-
Kori nuclear units 3 and 4 (SKN 3&4) and Shin-Hanul
nuclear units 1 and 2 (SHN 1&2), has been designed as a
non-safety system with two channels, and is not required
to meet the single failure criterion.
All OPR1000 and APR1400 nuclear units currently
have a DPS with two (2) channels. Using the 2-out-of-2
(2/2) coincidence logic, the DPS shown in Figure 1 can
prevent any spurious reactor trip or AFAS initiations.
However, the failure of one major DPS component can
directly cause a system failure as illustrated in the DPS
reliability block diagram of Figure 4. Therefore, the DPS
with a 2/2 coincidence logic can hardly be fault-tolerant,
because it does not have any redundant channels [12].
Considering fault tolerance issues, and the system devel-
opment situations of domestic and foreign diverse actuation
systems (DAS), the ADPS channel configuration has been
changed such that it has four (4) channels with the 2/4
coincidence logic. 
During the design process of the new DPS regarding
the D3 issues, the fault tolerance capability of the DPS
has been discussed. KEPCO E&C has designed a new
DPS, which is named the Advanced DPS (ADPS), to
enhance its fault-tolerant capability and to consider the
application of the single failure criterion to the extent
practically feasible.
Fault tolerance techniques enable a system to tolerate
misbehaviors occurring during operation. Effective and
complementary fault tolerance approaches incorporate fault
detection, fault containment, fault masking, safe fallback,
fault recovery, and signaling of misoperation [8].
The ADPS design illustrated in Figure 2 accommodates
the following fault tolerance and fault avoidance design
features:
Fault masking capability with redundant four (4)
channels using the 2-out-of-4 (2/4) voting logic, 
Fault masking capability with redundant actuation
devices, including two (2) sets of reactor trip switch-
gear systems (RTSS), 
Fault avoidance capability based on the changes of
software class, communication, and man-machine
interface (MMI).
CCF avoidance with the application of diverse
equipment platform for the ADPS compared with
that for the PPS.
The use of Class 1E process instrumentation (PI)
sensors and the RTSS for the DPS input and output
interfaces will contribute to the fault avoidance
capability of the system, because the equipment
qualification and overall reliability levels of the
Class 1E sensors and reactor trip actuation devices
are higher than those of non-Class 1E equipment,
Fault detection and location capability based on the
system trouble alarms and watch dog timers, and
Fault containment and recovery support capability
based on manual channel bypass, and maintenance
support for the replacement of faulty equipment.
2. ADPS DESIGN FEATURES FOR FAULT
MASKING 
The ATWS rule of 10 CFR 50.62 allows the DPS to
be a non-safety system if the system is of sufficient quality
to perform the necessary functions under the associated
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Fig. 1. PPS vs. DPS D3 Block Diagram for SKN 3&4
Fig. 2. PPS vs. ADPS D3 Block Diagram 
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event conditions [4&11]. The DPS for the APR1400 has
two identical channels as depicted in Figure 3.
To prevent an inadvertent DPS actuation, the DPS
reactor trip is performed by the 2/2 voting logic within
each DPS channel, and the 2/2 actuation logic of the MG
set output breakers.
Figure 4 shows the reliability block diagram (RBD)
for the DPS reactor trip caused by high pressurizer pressure.
Because of the 2/2 voting logic in each channel and the
2/2 actuation logic of the final actuation devices, all of
the blocks [i.e., two sensors (P-199X & P-199Y), all of
the related signal processing equipment in both DPS CH.
1 and 2 cabinets, and both MG Set 1 and 2 breakers] should
normally function to maintain overall system operability.
Therefore, the RBD of Fig. 4 shows that all the related
blocks are connected in series for the system function,
even though two DPS channels are physically configured
in parallel as shown in Figure 3. Fig. 4. DPS Reliability Block Diagram for APR1400 
Fig. 3. DPS Interface Block Diagram for SHN 1&2
Using the RBD of Fig. 4, the DPS reliability [RTotal(t)]
and average failure rate [hTotal] can be expressed as: 
Where the following are assumed:
1) System components are operated in the constant
failure rate region, 
2) Failure rates of both DPS channels are the same,
and
3) Failure rates of both MG sets are the same. 
Based on Eq. (2), we find that the RBD of Figure 4
indicates a doubled failure rate compared with a single
channel case. 
The DPS for APR1400 has the fault-tolerant features
of power supplies (feed from two power sources) and
controller CPU modules. But, the APR1400 DPS has an
overall limitation of fault tolerance as shown in Figure 2.
Any fault or failure within one block in Figure 2 can cause
the consequential failure of the system. In addition, the
DPS function for the APR1400 is temporally stopped when
one channel output is bypassed for maintenance and/or a
system test.
There has been no licensing requirement of single-
failure criterion for the DPS. But, the ADPS has been
designed to equip four channels with 2/4 voting logic for
the fault tolerance capability. Major reasons of the four
channel redundancy of the ADPS are as follows: 
At least two channels are required for the 2/4 voting
logic to prevent any spurious trip actuations,
One faulted channel can be bypassed during a
prolonged period of maintenance, 
One tested channel should be bypassed during the
automatic system test period,
With the four channels of redundancy, the system
can tolerate up to two channels of simultaneous
faults, and
As an overall result, the availability of the system can
be drastically enhanced by the use of four channels. 
The ADPS has direct interfaces with the RTSS as
depicted in Figures 2 and 5. Figure 7 illustrates the system
block diagram for ADPS. The local coincidence logic
(LCL) in each ADPS channel has the 2/4 voting logic. Each
ADPS channel initiates the reactor trip or ESF (i.e., AFAS
& SIAS) signals when the input signals from four sensors
meet the 2/4 voting logic, which also accommodates the
2/3 and 2/2 voting logics. The 2/4 voting logic with four
channels can be explained with six parallel connections
of two serially-connected channels as shown in Figure 6.
This means that at least two channels are required to be
operational for the ADPS operability. 
Figure 5 depicts the ADPS to the RTSS 1&2 interfaces.
Each RTSS has four separate trip circuit breakers (TCBs).
Each TCB can be tripped to open when either the Under-
Voltage (UV) relay or the Shunt Trip (ST) relay is actuated.
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Fig. 6. RBD for ADPS-to-RTSS 1&2 Connection
Fig. 5. ADPS to RTSS 1&2 Interfaces 
For the diversity strategy between the PPS and the ADPS,
the PPS provides its outputs to the total eight coils of UV
relays, and the ADPS also provides its outputs to the total
eight coils of ST relays. For the additional D3 concerns,
equipment diversity between RTSS-1 and RTSS-2 will
be provided.
The combination of two RTSS is necessary not only
for the ADPS but also for the PPS interfaces, because
one RTSS with four (4) TCBs has the limitations of
availability caused by its selective 2/4 actuation logic.
In general, a 2/4 voting logic consists of six (6) combi-
nations (i.e., 2C4 = 6). In Figure 5, each RTSS has four
TCBs. The RTSS-1 actuation logics are comprised of four
(4) combinations of TCB actuations (i.e., A-C, A-D, B-C,
and B-D), and the RTSS-2 actuation logics are also com-
prised of four combinations of TCB actuations (i.e., A-B,
A-D, B-C, and C-D). Therefore, the reactor trip actuations
of one RTSS can’t be full 2/4 logics. The actuation logic
with one RTSS is called a selective 2/4 actuation logic.
Trip actuation of either RTSS-1 or RTSS-2 can cause
the final reactor trip. Therefore, the RBD of RTSS-1 and
RTSS-2 should be connected in parallel as depicted in
Figure 6. The combination of RTSS 1&2 leads to the total
eight parallel RBD connections of two serially-connected
TCBs as illustrated in Figure 6. Therefore, the combined
effects of RTSS-1&2 correspond to a full 2/4 actuation logic.
Compared with the selective 2/4 actuation logic with one
RTSS, the full 2/4 actuation logics of RTSS-1&2 have the
benefit to meet the single-failure criterion even during
the RTSS test for each TCB. 
Using the RBD of Fig. 6, the ADPS reliability of the
reactor trip can be expressed with either Eq. (4) or (5). 
Where the following are assumed:
1) System components are operated in the constant
failure rate region,
2) Failure rates of all ADPS channels are the same, and
3) Failure rates of all TCBs are the same.
Total system reliability can also be expressed as:
By comparing Figures 4 and 6 to each other, the fault
masking capability of the APDS can be clearly explained
with Figure 6. There is no redundant signal path in Figure 4.
However, Figure 6 indicates that a lot of redundant paths
are provided in the RBD of the DPS-RTSS combination
for the ADPS. Up to two faulted channels and/or TCBs
can be masked. 
3. ADPS DESIGN FEATURES FOR FAULT
AVOIDANCE
Fault avoidance or fault prevention approaches are
employed during the design and development phase to
reduce the number of faults introduced during this phase
of the system life cycle. The fault avoidance principles
include the avoidance of unnecessary complexity in func-
tional specification, the application of well defined devel-
opment processes, the use of appropriate methods and
tools, the use of competent and knowledgeable personnel,
the application of suitable rules and guidelines, the use of
dependable and well understood components and platforms,
and taking into consideration lessons learned from past
mistakes and faults in similar systems [8]. 
Fault avoidance efforts regarding the ADPS design
should be done twofold as follows: 
A plant-wide CCF reduction approach is required
to maintain the ADPS functions during the CCF of
safety I&C systems, including the PPS and ESF-
CCS, based on the plant D3 requirements [9], and
A system internal fault tolerance approach is
required to enhance the reliability and availability
of the ADPS.
Compared with the DPS for the APR1400 nuclear
units, many fault avoidance design features are provided
for the ADPS. The fault avoidance design features can be
summarized as follows:
System software design class has been upgraded from
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the combination of ITS & ITA for the DPS to ITS
only for the ADPS. The ITA software is reviewed
by the design team during software design
processes, while the ITS software is verified by an
independent V&V team. Therefore, the software
design faults can be reduced through the V&V
activities.
System communication methods between the DPS
and the IPS have been changed from a bidirectional
network to a dedicated unidirectional data-link
method. The unidirectional data-link can prevent
any malicious changes of system data from others.
Levels 4 and 3 equipment of the cyber security
program are required to use a unidirectional data
transfer method [16]. 
Major system MMI has been changed from the IPS
operator station to the ADPS Operator Modules
(ADPS-OM).
System platform is changed from the distributed
control system (DCS) to the FPGA-based logic
controller (FLC). 
ADPS cabinets are designed as a non-safety class, but
the PI sensors and the reactor trip actuation devices
(i.e., RTSS) for the DPS input/output interfaces are
changed from non-Class 1E to Class 1E. 
RTSS 1&2 will be implemented with at least two
(2) diversity principles, which are the equipment
diversity between RTSS-1 and RTSS-2, and the
RTSS trip coil diversity between the undervoltage
trip coils driven by the PPS, and the shunt trip coils
driven by the ADPS.
The location of the ADPS cabinets will be more
distributed from two separate rooms to four separate
rooms.
The ADPS shown in Figure 7 has the fault masking
and avoidance design features described in this paper. 
Dedicated diverse PI sensors are used for the DPS for
OPR1000 and APR1400 nuclear units. However, the ADPS
will use the class 1E PI sensors (rather than dedicated
non-Class 1E PI sensors) through the isolators because of
the following reasons: 
The environmental qualification level of the PI sensors
should be enhanced considering the newly added
Fig. 7. ADPS Internal Architecture and Interfaces
SIAS function, which should be maintained during
the harsh environment of an LBLOCA event,
U.S. NRC’s 10 CFR 50.62 allows the use of non-
dedicated sensors for the ATWS mitigation system
[4], and 
Diversity strategies for the DAS for advanced reactors
are not uniform. Dedicated non-safety grade sensors
are used for the two channel DAS for the APR1400
and AP1000 plants. However, safety-grade sensors
are used, and they are shared by both the protection
system and the four channel DAS, for the US-APWR
and U.S. EPR plants [13&14]. 
4. ADPS FAULT DETECTION, LOCATION,
CONTAINMENT, AND RECOVERY
Fault detection of the ADPS can be initiated by the
trouble alarms. The trouble alarm is generated by the ADPS
program logic if any trouble occurs. The troubles include
the cabinet door being open, any trouble of power supplies,
controller errors, etc. Each ADPS channel separately
generates its own trouble alarm.
In addition, the maintenance and test panel (MTP) in
each channel can reports the detailed cause of its trouble
alarm. Watchdog timers will also be applied to the ADPS
design to detect the occurrence of S/W CCF. A watchdog
timer can detect faults in a few seconds when the faults
halt the processor [10]. Most of the fault location process
can be done with the help of ADPS trouble alarms on the
ADPS-OM and the MTP trouble report. 
Fault containment of the ADPS can be manually done
by the bypass of the troubled channel. Fault recovery can
also be done manually by the replacement or maintenance
of troubled equipment, and then the removal of the channel
bypass. Each channel controller has redundant dual CPU
modules and dual power supply modules. These modules
are hot-swappable. The fault detection, location, contain-
ment, and recovery processes for the ADPS will be further
developed, and will be specified in detail in the system
technical manual. 
5. ADPS FAULT TOLERANCE EVALUATION 
The major fault-tolerant capability of the ADPS comes
from the H/W redundancy as described in Section II of this
paper. The DPS for APR1400 has no channel redundancy,
and it has no redundancy of final actuation devices. There-
fore, all the major equipment is connected in series in the
RBD of Fig. 4. Equation (3) shows that the mean time to
failure (MTTF) of the APR1400 DPS is about a half of
the single channel case. By contrast to the APR1400 DPS
case, the RBD of Fig. 6 for the reactor trip of ADPS shows
a lot of serial and parallel combinations of DPS channels
and RTSS TCBs. As a result of the RBD analysis, the
MTTF of the ADPS is about the same as the single channel
case.
Channel reliability of the ADPS is expected to be
higher than that of the APR1400, because the PI sensors
will be changed to Class 1E rather than non-Class 1E,
and all of the system S/W will be designed as ITS class.
The reliability of reactor trip actuation devices for the
ADPS is also expected to be higher than that for the DPS
of APR1400, because the Class 1E TCB’s of RTSS will
replace the non-Class 1E MG set breakers, i.e., the failure
rate of the Class 1E TCB is expected to be lower than
that of the non-Class 1E MG set breaker.
The MTTF Improvement Ratio (MIR) can be defined
as Eq. (7) to compare the ADPS-MTTF (Eq. (6)) to the
DPS-MTTF (Eq. (3)) for reactor trip function. The MIR
evaluation result shows that the MTTF of the ADPS can
be enhanced at least twice compared with that of the DPS
for APR1400: 
The failure rates of each ADPS channel and TCB can be
assumed to be less than those of each DPS channel and
MG set breaker, respectively.
Besides the fault masking features, several fault
avoidance and detection features will be incorporated in
the ADPS design as illustrated in Table 1.
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Table 1. Fault Tolerance Features of the ADPS
(7)
6. CONCLUSIONS
Various fault-tolerant design features of the ADPS
have been introduced to enhance the system reliability and
the plant protection reliability against CCFs within the
safety-grade protection systems. The most significant
fault-tolerant feature of the ADPS reactor trip function is
the fault masking capability with the use of four redundant
channels with the 2/4 voting logic, and the use of multiple
(total eight) TCBs of RTSS 1&2 for the 2/4 actuation
logic. With this fault masking capability, the MTTF of
the ADPS is expected to be doubled compared with that
of the DPS for the APR1400. 
In addition to the fault masking features, several fault
avoidance and detection features have been developed for
the ADPS design as described in Table 1. Fault diagnosis
functions to help the fault detection, location, containment,
and recovery processes will be further developed for the
ADPS.
Therefore, it is expected that the new DPS in Korean
nuclear units will be even more reliable and dependable
based on the ADPS design techniques. The ADPS will be
further developed by KEPCO E&C to enhance its fault
tolerance capability and to meet the plant D3 requirements. 
NOMENCLATURE
ADPS Advanced Diverse Protection System
AFAS Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal
AL Actuation Logic 
APC-S Auxiliary Process Cabinet - Safety
APR Advanced Power Reactor 
ATWS Anticipated Transient without Scram 
CCF Common Cause Failure
CCS Component Control System
CH. Channel
D3 Diversity and Defense-in-Depth
DAS Diverse Actuation System
DBE Design Basis Event
DPS Diverse Protection System 
DRCS Digital Rod Control System 
EQ Equipment
ESF Engineered Safety Feature
FLC FPGA-based Logic Controller
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
I&C Instrumentation and Control
IPS Information Processing System 
ITA Important-to-Availability
ITS Important-to-Safety 
LBLOCA Large-Break Loss of Coolant Accident 
MG Set Motor Generator Set 
MIR MTTF Improvement Ratio  
MMI Man-Machine Interface 
MTP Maintenance and Test Panel
MTTF Mean Time to Failure
OM Operator Module
OPR1000 Optimized Power Reactor 1000
PI Process Instrumentation
PPS Plant Protection System 
PZR Pressurizer
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
RTSS Reactor Trip Switchgear System
SIAS Safety Injection Actuation Signal
ST Shunt Trip
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